Abstract: -During a real-time power system event, a system operator needs to conservatively reduce operating limits while the changing system conditions are analyzed. The time it takes to develop new operating limits could affect millions of transmission system users, especially if this event is classified by NERC as a Category D type event (extreme events resulting in the loss of two or more bulk electric system elements). Controls for the future grid must be able to perform real-time analysis, identify new reliability risks, and set new SOLs (System Operating Limit) for real-time operations. In this paper we are developing "Resilience Metrics" requirements that describe how systems operate at an acceptable level of normalcy despite disturbances or threats. We consider the interdependencies inherent in critical infrastructure systems and discuss some distributed resilience metrics that can be in current supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) to provide a level of state awareness. This level of awareness provides knowledge that can be used to characterize and reduce the risk of cascading events. A "resilience power system agent" is proposed that provides attributes to measure and perform this metrics.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Critical Infrastructure and Resilience
Modern societies depend on the stable, efficient, and secure operation of critical infrastructure. Hurricane Sandy, the Stuxnet virus, and the 2003 east coast blackout bluntly reminded us how natural and un-natural events can dramatically upset the complex systems that provide energy, transportation, water, medical care, emergency response, and security. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" recognized the need to advance research and development for resilient critical infrastructure.
At the core of critical infrastructure operation are industrial control systems (ICS). Although often portrayed to be a highly autonomous, efficient, effective and resilient control systems, modern control systems are effectively digital versions of the analog systems and algorithms invented prior to 1970, adding only a communication network for central monitoring and digital computers to ease implementation of feedback controls. Unfortunately, the ability to network distributed components has established a framework that includes additional complex cyber security, human cognitive and control system interdependencies, resulting in brittle systems with increased potential for cascading failures. Current control systems lack the inherent ability to analyze asymmetric, unexpected failures of the energy infrastructure system controlled, and often require the operator/dispatcher to also be the analyst and root cause expert. Even with decision support tools, the human in the loop is required to mine a large volume of data received. Ultimately, modern control systems are reliable but lack the resilient framework needed to achieve global production efficiencies, let alone the ability to recognize and optimize a response to a natural or manmade malicious or benign, unintended event. Therefore, there exists a fundamental gap to establishing resilient critical infrastructure systems.
In contrast, a resilient control system holistically considers the challenges in developing a control system that maintains state awareness and an accepted level of normalcy in response to disturbances, including threats of an unanticipated and malicious nature [1] . Therefore, resilient control is a design and operational methodology which encompasses the whole of system performance, including cyber security, physical security, economic efficiency, dynamic performance, and process compliance, in large-scale, complex systems [2] .
B. Resilience Metrics for the Power System
One such large and complicated critical infrastructure system is the electric power grid. Electric grid modernization, through smart grid development, provides an opportunity to incorporate resilient control system architectures. Smart grids add many more capabilities to measure, control, and manage the generation, distribution and the consumption of electrical power in a manner that is intended to produce a more available, cleaner, stable and economical supply of electricity. The power of additional information is obvious (e.g. optimization of transmission assets, integration of greater renewable generation, and economic assessments and decisions put into the hands of consumers). However, the counterpoint is a more complex and computerized system with more potential cyber and physical vulnerabilities that also imposes additional human performance demands on the people monitoring and making operational decisions using a plethora of new data. Resilience seeks to optimize when possible, but to never sacrifice, operational minimums that risk large consequences through unintentional introduction of brittleness. To measure a system with respect to resilience, a set of measurable and comparable metrics needs to be established in detail.
The Hurricane Sandy event analysis report [6] and Stuxnet virus attack on Iran nuclear facilities are two use case scenarios for demonstrating how the system integrity metrics can be applied to establish performance. The effects can be mapped into the power systems processes that roll into the customer interruption reliability indexes.
To establish this type of control system a metric is needed that can capture the resilience and complex nature, its associated hierarchies and the optimization of the interactions or interdependencies [3] . The following classes of disturbances will be evaluated to develop a unifying approach to design metrics to assess system resilience characteristics [4] :  Physical Disturbances  Cyber Disturbances  Cognitive Disturbances A unifying approach to such performance characteristics is dependent on both time and data integrity. Time, both in terms of delay of mission and communications latency, and data, in terms of corruption or modification, are normalizing factors. In general, the idea is to base the metric on "what is expected" and not necessarily the actual initiator that caused the degradation.
To implement metrics we are going to suggest the deployment of "multi-agent systems" (MAS), which offer a notional framework for controlling not only physical systems but also cyber systems and the hybrid interplay between the two. To begin first we need to define why using MAS design is the best way to achieve resiliency in wide area power system.
II. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS (MAS)
Why multi-agent design?
1) What is an agent?
Agents were developed as a mechanism to describe objects, "informing, requesting, offering, accepting, rejecting, competing with and assisting one another" [7] , [8] . Early development of agent identities were directed toward artificial intelligence in computer science applications [9] , rather than to the dynamics of control. The definition of an agent is varied, depending upon its application [9] , [10] . In general, an intelligent agent can be described as a semi-autonomous entity that evaluates the state of its environment and applies control actions towards achieving goals within this environment, such as is depicted in Fig. 1 . By referring to it as semi-autonomous, the implication is that the agent has a predefined sphere of influence that establishes the boundaries of its autonomy. Considering the definition for a resilient control system, a further refinement can be made. It follows that a "resilient" intelligent agent is one which maintains a state awareness of its environment and responds to disturbances in order to maintain operational normalcy within this environment.
2) Resilient multi-agent design
There are several factors that influence the philosophies that govern how resilience multi-agent performance goals are set, and these factors require consideration when establishing the policy for a distributed control system. Below is a list of some factors that should be considered with control system decomposition:
• Regulatory Requirements: Coming primarily from governmental agencies that regulate the operation of critical infrastructure. • Desired Performance: Whether a quality or an efficiency objective, this aspect comes as a secondary objective for resilience because the mean objective of these control system are to keep the system stable and minimize outage.
• Physics-based Limitations: The physics of the design affect the limits of the operation. While this might seem obvious, one must collectively include this when considering the tradeoffs of performance.
Fig. 1. Agent Attributes
3) Resilient multi-agent requirements
Research and development (R&D) and presentations at associated international symposia have developed the technological perspectives and definitions of resilience. It is timely to establish a means to evaluate technology investment into R&D that will mature technologies into industrial applications. In addition, as a ground truth for impacts from manmade and natural events, a method to correlate operational awareness is required. In line with these needs, metrics are necessary to establish the following:
• System Integrity: establish ongoing system run-time performance • Business Case for Resilience: establish the value proposition based upon desired Performance To evaluate both of these types of metrics, a unifying approach to recognizing impact of cognitive, cyber-physical affects regardless of the initiator is necessary. To this end, the Disturbance Impact and Resilience Evaluation Curve (DIREC) provides an appropriate starting point [23] . Referring to Fig. 2 , definitions associated with the DIREC are as follows:
• Agility: The derivative of the disturbance curve describing the rate at which the control system can respond to a disturbance once recognized. This term and metric define the ability of the system to resist degradation of performance due to the disturbance as well as the rate of recovery toward optimum operational conditions. • Robustness: A positive or negative number associated with the area between the disturbance curve and the resilience threshold, indicating either the capacity or insufficiency, respectively. • Adaptive Capacity: The ability of the system to adapt to or transform from impact and maintain minimum normalcy. Considered a value between 0 and 1, where 1 is fully operational and 0 is the minimum resilience threshold. Within the context of applying contingency plans this metric contains the degree to which actions are available to maintaining minimum normalcy performance levels (e.g. component or system's ability to support alternate paths of power distribution) • Adaptive Insufficiency: The inability of the system to adapt or transform from impact, indicating an unacceptable performance loss due to the disturbance. Considered a value between 0 and -1, where 0 is the resilience threshold and -1 is total loss of operation.
• Brittleness: The area under the disturbance curve as intersected by the resilience threshold. This indicates the impact from the loss of operational normalcy.
• Resiliency: The converse of brittleness, which for a resilience system is "zero" loss of minimum normalcy.
Fig. 2. Disturbance and Impact Resilience Evaluation Curve (DIREC) is illustrated.
In the discussion in the following sections, we will first correlate several disturbances that can be characterized within the distributed power system to pertaining to data and time. Performance between normal and the resilience threshold will then be quantified. Finally, a framework to integrate both data and time disturbance representations will be provided, representing a state awareness that can be used to provide a local and/or regional response to mitigate.
III. RESILIENCE POWER SYSTEM AGENT DEVELOPMENT
The following provides a view of commonly used classifications for power system performance. Four power system attributes are presented that can be measured in terms of time and/or data to recognize a disturbance.
A. Power system small signal stability (Data)
Power system stability has been recognized as an important problem for secure system operation since the1920s [19] , [20] . The major blackouts caused by power system instability have illustrated the importance of this phenomenon [21] . Traditional distributed control for most sectors predates digital control systems, and maintains global stability by maintaining local stability of individual control areas using local measurements.
Within the power grid, a similar context is maintained but also reflects larger geographic regions. While this mechanism remains the most practical, its flaw lies in the fact that an understanding of global performance as a feedback measure is not achieved. To analyze global system performance at a planning stage, we traditionally apprehend power system reaction to small disturbances happening at specific locations and the systems capability to keep synchronism in the face of a set of feasible operating conditions. It is referred to as small signal stability evaluation [16] . The ability to perform these studies will is highly dependent on the a-priori knowledge the person performing the studies has on how the system is likely to respond.
B. Power system transient stability (Data)
Another global performance characteristic that is assessed in a planning stage is called transient stability margin. A power system is transiently stable if the power system maintains synchronism during the response to severe disturbances like a transmission line experience a fault and breakers opening, and the resulting fluctuations in phase angle and voltage. Real time first principles modeling of large systems to determine the margin between stable response and unstable response for a given operating state may be untenable from a practical standpoint due limitations of computational power. Mechanisms are needed to determine what the global optima is to measure to determine where a given operating condition is near a boundary of stability. In addition, global efficiency as well as stability is important to next generation resilient designs [16] .
C. Power system communication latency (Time)
Consensus and feedback loop stability can be affected by latencies in the communication and computational processes of the control system architecture. Research into the effects and constraints on latencies has been performed to determine impact on control system stability [11] . Several different approaches have been taken, including evaluating the impact on individual control algorithms and determining maximum acceptable latency. Other methodologies have characterized latency as part of the overall dynamics of a multi-agent hierarchy, representing communications links as transfer functions between individual agents that are stabilized by a given control algorithm [12] .
D. Power system physical degradation (Data and Time)
Dependence upon sensor data for judgment dictates that a method to ensure graceful degradation is needed to monitor health of the system and change sensor combinations used to achieve observability and controllability in the face of degradation of the power system or the sensor system. In addition, the characterization of a physical attribute may include modeling coupled with sensor data, or strictly synthetic data from a mathematical observer. The sensory framework, therefore, must provide methods for interpreting information quality, in addition to sensor and control device redundancy and diversity to allow for reconfiguration based upon degradation or outright failure [13] [14] . From a control theory perspective, similar considerations are necessary to enable maintaining critical control when failures are detected. This may include access to alternative paths and associated controls, but not necessarily the switching of components (parallel paths may be online at all times).
IV. PROPOSED RESILIENCE AGENT
A. Small signal stability For small signal stability, the agent should be able to assess regional small signal stability concerns by calculating local eigenvalues of the region state metrics. For our agent to truly detect any small signal stability issues, first we need to identify the oscillatory phenomena that are of most concern. These phenomena are local, inter-area, control and torsional mode oscillations [16] and if these oscillations continue to increase, or fail to decrease, over a relatively long period of time (5-20 seconds) following a disturbance, the power system will be defined as being in an unstable state.
The first factor for small signal stability characterization in the power system is the initial operating condition of the power system. The proposed agent will evaluate the current system operation compared with predetermined optimal operating conditions and ranks the local system on a scale from 0 to 1. Where 1 is the highest resilience level and 0 is imminent loss of small signal stability.
The second factor is a measure of power system electrical connectivity in conjunction with other agents in the system. This would require the agent to be able to identify optimal local and global interconnectivity in its view of the power system. The power system asset manager would also play role in this determination. After the agent is able to identify the most optimal interconnection, it would evaluate the present system against the optimal interconnection and create an acceptable band limit between in the system from 0 to 1. Where 1 is the highest optimal level and 0 is minimal interconnection.
The next factor is existing control system characteristics. For the agent to be able to understand existing control system characteristics, it would need to be able to identify the following characteristics without effecting power system operation: controller accuracy, timeline, flexibility, corrective action, and controller exceptions.
Lastly our agent should be able to calculate local system eigenvalues for the system and its controllers based on the equations describing the response of the power system voltage magnitude and angle to disturbances and provide equivalent system presentation to neighboring agents as their system equivalent. Fig. 3 shows the state-space representation the agent will develop during system evaluation. As an example of how this power system stability agent is formed, we look to a control theory representation. By using above state space model we can model the power system small signal stability by calculating the eigenvalues of the following equations.
After the eigenvalue is calculated by the agent, the agent can determine the local stability limits. It does this by evaluating local plant mode oscillations, inter-machine mode oscillations and possibly torsional mode oscillations with the operating conventional generation and low inertia renewable energy sources and compares them to results from planning studies evaluating the system. After the results from each agent are evaluated for local signal stability, is the outputs are combined with those from other distributed agents. The net result is to create a distributed wide-area power system equivalent to evaluate inter-area mode oscillations problems in power system. The architecture to achieve the inter-area mode can be created by assigning one agent as master agent to evaluate local agent computational calculations for computational intensive tasks, such as is done currently with inter-area mode oscillations problems [15] [16] . After the local and wide-area small signal stability levels are determined, a small signal stability agent will create a resilience band around the eigenvalues and identify a resilience stability region, such as is shown in Fig. 4 .
If, due to dynamic instability/change in the power system, the eigenvalues move out of these predefined areas, the stability agent will inform neighboring agents to consider the effect of possible small signal instability. Any changes to system that would affect eigenvalues location will change the system response to contingency. For example if our system changes from Figs. 4a to 4b, the system impulse response will change dramatically and under some conditions becomes unstable system as shown in Figs. 5a and 5b. This shows us that any changes to eigenvalue would affect the system response to disturbances. 
B. Transient Stability
Transient stability margin is the representation of the power system capability to maintain synchronism between generators in separate areas of the system during severe transient disturbances. The resilience agent must be able to evaluate the resilience level of power system to measure the ability to stay stable in the face of a large transient event, or a sequence of transient events in an extreme weather situation. To prevent cascading failures, this new agent needs to be able to evaluate local and wide-area power system transient stability before a transient event propagates.
A transient event occurs when conditions such as a short circuit fault and subsequent removal of a transmission line, or tripping of a transformer, a generator, or loss of load are introduced into the power system [16] . Therefore, the ability to evaluate the system transient stability margin starting from a given operating state is an important property to characterize. A key point is to determine what constitutes a stable response, and what to measure in the agent. To evaluate transient stability margin for a region, each distributed agent needs to share transient system information to neighboring agents to establish a global transient stability level.
The best way for the agent to evaluate transient stability is to first establish the thresholds and region of responsibility for optimal power system operation. These thresholds will be determined by detailed off-line power system studies in planning. Other factors to establish good transient stability models in power systems are; generation mix (type of generating units), operating point (current state of power system), and connectivity changes prior to and then during an evolving disturbance. The system could move on a trajectory where the time margins to respond to the next fault shrink to be near or eventually smaller than the minimum clearing time for the protective devices.
First the agent will identify a slowest clearing time for devices in its region, because the protective clearing time has profound effect in system transient stability. Evaluating the overall clearing time in the agent sphere of influence is done by evaluating all relay setting database and breaker equipment clearing times, which can be normally be found in a central asset management database for the power system operator. Finally, the agent could run all required contingencies in the distributed system, and based on predefined acceptable local generation response, identify the resilience level in local and wide-area power system. In Fig. 6 is an example of the response of distributed power system that contains three generators (labeled 2, 3, and 4). For this study the variation in the phase angle of each generator is shown. The proposed agent will evaluate the contingency cases and evaluate each for acceptable performance. In this case the distributed power system will provide sufficient performance and transient resilience if the generator angle is below the red line for generators 2 and 4 and above the red line for generator 3. The thresholds are determined in the planning stage. 
C. Power System Latency
To evaluate system latency we are proposing the use of the Hmac-based One-Time Password algorithm (HOTP) and Time-based One-time Password algorithm (TOTP) for generating one-time encrypted code. With HOTP, the neighboring agents share a secret value and a counter, which are used to compute a onetime code independently on both sides. Whenever a code is generated and used, the counter is incremented on both sides, allowing the agents to remain in sync. TOTP essentially uses the same algorithm as HOTP with one major difference. The counter used in TOTP is replaced by the current time. The agents remain in sync as long as the system times (using satellite time synchronization) remain the same. This can be done by using the Network Time protocol available on the SCADA system. The secret key (as well as the counter in the case of HOTP) has to be communicated to both the server and the client at some point in time. In the case of our proposed agent, this is done in the form of a QRCode encoded uniform resource locator (URL) such as used by other programs like Google Authenticator. Using this technique not only provides us with network latency, but also prevents unauthorized equipment from being seen as legitimate by other agents. Acceptable latency for resilient agent will be different between devices in different situations, but as rule we will require minimum of 0.95 rating. For example since fault clearing times have a profound effect on power system transient stability as described above, communication delay between wide-area Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) can affect the system stability and therefore overall system resiliency [22] .
D. Power Physical Degradation
To evaluate physical degradation we are using neighboring agent's information to monitor the health of each sensor. To truly be able to evaluate physical health of the sensors we are requiring each agent to use two distinct evaluation processes. The first evaluation process is to use local sensor data and the second process is to use remote terminal agent information. To evaluate physical degradation in sensor data we will be ranking degradation error as data quality between to neighboring agents. This topic has being studied in detail in papers [17] , [18] .
V. AGENT SIMULATION MODEL
The proposed agents are critical for power system infrastructure resiliency. To perform an initial evaluation of the full capability of proposed agents we are planning use an IEEE 12 bus test system that feeds multiple critical and noncritical loads. Normally only a few physical variables will describe the interactions. For example, the voltage angle and voltage magnitude characteristics must remain within a specified range to maintain power system stability. Also the power quality delivered the each customer should meet minimum standards set by standards or regulatory bodies. The viability and constraints of scaling the results of this use case to larger systems will be considered as well.
As a simple example, suppose there has been a fault in a proposed agent area. This agent will monitor the power system dynamics to see how protective relaying isolates the faulted area and based on new power system network configuration information inferred from measurements and communicated by other agents. The agent will evaluate the post-outage power small signal and transient system stability, and then score these two metrics from 0 to 1. Then agent will evaluate available communication network time latency. By using methods proposed on [17] , [18] the agent will rank power system degradation degree.
For example, suppose the agent rates the small signal stability on its post fault distributed area as 0.80, transient stability as 0.60, evaluate no changes to communication delay (0.95), and physical degradation to 0.70.Now based on above ranking and for now assuming equally weighted importance factors, our distributed agent would rank resilience level at 3.05 out of 4.00. This ranking could be used by the system operator as well as the centralized control agent to evaluate the resilience level on wide area power system. Depending on the importance of the individual elements, awareness is provided that can translate to taking corrective actions necessary to increase the power system resilient level for possible upcoming contingencies.
Evaluation methods like ReCoSEA [5] could also be implemented for given metric's aspects. ReCoSEA, in general, provides a framework for normalizing and rationalizing a cyber-physical disturbance. Time impacts that are reflected through destabilizing latencies may be the result of cyberattacks. Data impacts may be reflected through integrity compromises resulting from cyber-attacks or power grid instability. How these are integrated and weighed depend upon the overall impact to power grid performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper has introduced four resilience metrics, the attributes of which can be integrated into distributed agents. These attributes collectively evaluate the resiliency status of a power system during abnormal events and measures the system performance against minimum performance expectations. The performance expectation will depend on system SOL levels and power system contingency status. To ensure the resilience of the overall framework, evaluation of both the data-based and time-based layers are introduced to ensure any stability issues are recognized. Ultimately these metrics will evolve to evaluate distance from resilience boundaries during normal and evolving conditions. By keeping the lights on (maintaining system resiliency) and using resilience metrics to find the lowest cost solutions to maintain resilience allows Transmission Operators and owners to plan transmission system maintenance outage conditions and upgrades and set SOLs to maintain resilience. Also having the set of accurate system models distributed in agents and high-performance controllers provides engineers with the ability to ensure reliability while quickly restoring customer access to transmission system due to any type of event.
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